外交的思索への誘い

東京大学法学部大学院教授、小原雅博。国際政治や日本外交について綴る。

日経·経済教室

日経新聞、経済教室にG7サミットについての論考が経済されました。

2017/5/22

 

 

 f:id:xiaoyuanyabo:20170916130859j:image

ghten the screws on North Korea World must increase diplomatic, economic and military pressure on Pyongyang

Japan Times に載りました。

北朝鮮の核ミサイル問題についての論考。


JUL 31, 2017)

Since 1994, North Korea has used negotiations to buy time and to extort diplomatic concessions and economic assistance from the international community. Now it may only be a matter of time before North Korea’s propaganda gets real.

Pyongyang’s recent ICBM tests could transform the strategic theater. There are growing concerns and skepticism that the international community has no good policy options to stop North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. However, it still has more things to do. Most important at this moment is sanctions.

First, the international community has to implement all existing sanctions on North Korea fully and effectively. According to a report released by the U.N. Panel of Experts on North Korea in February, the “implementation [of sanctions] remains insufficient and highly inconsistent.” Some countries have maintained permissive and accommodating stances toward Pyongyang’s unlawful and brazen acts such as the assassination of North Korean leader Kim’s Jong Un’s half-brother, Kim Jong Nam.

Such stances could allow North Korea to entrench its global business networks and increase their sophistication and scale. North Korea shamelessly made a global appeal for 192 U.N. member states to reconsider enforcing U.N. sanctions in May. Japan and like-minded countries should organize and carry out a campaign to urge member states to seriously recognize the threat posed by North Korea and eliminate its illicit worldwide activities through the full implementation of the U.N. sanctions.

Second, the international community should also apply new and tougher sanctions. One of the most effective is secondary sanctions against those who do business with Pyongyang. In 2005, the United States designated Banco Delta Asia, a Macau-based bank, to be a “primary money laundering concern.” The designation required U.S. banks to ensure that its customers were not conducting business transactions with Banco Delta Asia. The bank was frozen out the U.S. financial system overnight. In addition to this direct effect, other non-U.S. financial institutions severed their ties with North Korea, not wanting to risk entanglement in North Korean illicit activities and face possible expulsion from the globally dominant U.S. financial market. That had a significant impact on the Kim regime.

In June, the U.S. Treasury Department designated China’s Bank of Dandong a primary money-laundering concern. More banks should be targeted if it’s found they have illicit dealings with North Korea.

Also important is global action against North Korean “guest workers.” More than 50,000 North Koreans work in China, Russia, South East Asia and elsewhere with the aim of circumventing U.N. sanctions and earning hard currency. The host countries should shut down that flow of cash into the North Korean dictator’s pockets.

To really pressure North Korea, China can cut off its oil supply. In 2003, China closed an oil pipeline supplying North Korea for three days. A few month later, North Korea joined the six-party talks. An article by the Global Times, a Communist Party-affiliated newspaper, in April argued that Beijing should limit its oil exports if North Korea conducts another nuclear test. Since then, North Korea has yet to conduct a nuclear weapon test.

Without Chinese oil, North Korea could not survive on its own. Beijing worries about the impact a collapse of the North Korean economy and the ensuing instability would have on China, such as massive influx of refugees from North Korea. It also worries that it eventually could result in a final act of suicidal nuclear defiance by Kim.

Beijing is also worried that its influence on Pyongyang might be further eroded as Kim’s regime has been trying to reduce its dependence on China through an expansion of trade with Russia and Southeast Asia. Russia appears to have replaced China as the top supplier of jet fuel to North Korea following China’s suspension of such exports in 2013. If China restricts its oil exports to North Korea, Russia may fill the gap. These are China’s dilemmas and present a challenge for the international community in its effort to work together toward denuclearization. In a nutshell, the probability of the next nuclear test depends upon Kim’s calculation on this dilemma.

China’s trade with North Korea rose more than 10 percent in the first half of 2017 from a year earlier. Earlier China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman said that as a neighboring country of North Korea, China has maintained “normal” economic relations and trade. However, Beijing’s policy to decouple the denuclearization issue from its relationship with North Korea is no longer relevant and even undermines China’s security interests. Skepticism about China’s pressure on North Korea is also increasing in the U.S. and elsewhere.

Meanwhile, Beijing is beginning to view the Trump administration’s policy of pressuring North Korea as inconsistent. U.S. President Donald Trump once said that “all options are on the table,” and had put on a show of force by sending the Carl Vinson carrier strike group to the waters off the Korea Peninsula, but that military pressure soon subsided.

Although it is important to apply continued economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea, that will not be enough to compel the Kim regime to freeze and eventually abandon its nuclear program. Military pressure will also be critical.

The U.S. should show its determination and capability as the strongest military power in the world to Kim until negotiations are underway.

In this regard, almost all experts argue that a preemptive strike against North Korea is virtually untenable unless a North Korean attack is eminent. This observation is reasonable and widely held, but such assertions by smart pundits are unhelpful for levying meaningful pressure on Kim. They must recognize that the U.S. is playing a game of chicken with a ruthless dictator. To eliminate an impending threat, some risk must be taken. Otherwise, the threat will become increasingly bigger as the lesson of the 1938 Munich Agreement shows. That’s the dilemma we are facing now.

If Kim sniffs an element of bluff or a bravado in the U.S. effort to apply military pressure, it will never work. Then China won’t draw the short straw by taking tougher actions against North Korea. The strategic cooperative posture emerged at the summit meeting between Trump and Xi in April turned out a short-lived illusion.

Now we face the danger of Kim’s increasing military confidence, which raises the risks of increased belligerence. The international community must be united in increasing diplomatic, economic and military pressure on Pyongyang. These are an essential and minimum prerequisite for any future negotiations with North Korea.

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Masahiro Kohara is a professor at the University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Law and Politics. Previously he served as a career diplomat in the Foreign Ministry. 

最近の活動

雑誌「外交」都市出版 Vol.42.  (34p〜 「偉大なる米国」の衰退と二つの危機)

 

雑誌「中央公論」5月号 (130p〜 国益とはなにか・「トランプ時代」の危機と日本の戦略)

 

NHK 日曜討論 2017.04.16 「“挑発”続ける北朝鮮

 

トランプ時代の世界を考える

 トランプ新政権の「不確実性」に世界が揺れる中、日米首脳会談では揺るぎない日米同盟が確認されました。それは、日本の生存と安全という死活的国益に留まらず、パワー・バランスの変化するアジアの安定にとってもタイムリーで効果的なインパクトを持つものとなったと言えます。

 また、トランプ大統領は、安倍総理と「非常に相性がいい」と述べましたが、日米首脳間の親密な関係はそれ自体がアジアにおいては戦略的メッセージとなり、したたかな首脳外交として評価することもできるでしょう。

 しかし、世界の指導者の中では安倍総理は格別な存在かもしれません。トランプ大統領は、隣国のメキシコ大統領に「奴ら(不法移民)を取り締まらなければ軍隊を送る」と脅したり、同盟国の豪州首相には「最悪の電話会談だ」と言って予定の半分もしないで打ち切ったりして、その激しい性格を世界に印象付けています。

 2月のギャラップの世論調査では、回答したアメリカ人の67%が「世界の指導者はトランプ大統領に敬意を抱いていない」と答えています。2009年に就任したオバマ大統領については、逆に67%が「世界の指導者に敬意を持たれている」と答えていたので、大変な違いです。

 世界秩序を支えてきた超大国アメリカの第45代大統領となった型破りの人物は、アメリカをどう変え、世界をどう変えるのでしょうか?

 既に多くの議論がなされ、「リベラル秩序の崩壊」、「パックス・アメリカーナ(アメリカによる平和)の終焉」、「米中新冷戦」といった見解も発表されています。

 本ブログは、そうした議論も踏まえ、「トランプ時代」を迎えたアメリカと世界はどう変化していくのか、アジアを中心とする外交問題から民主主義の危機や反グローバリズムなど政治や経済の問題まで取り上げて、世界の行方を展望してみたいと思います。

East Asia, China and Japan in the age of Donald Trump

The Japan Times JAN 26, 2017 掲載

トランプ政権誕生を受けての東アジア秩序と日中関係について考えてみました。

 

U.S. President Donald Trump’s inauguration speech and executive orders pose grave concerns and uncertainties for American allies and partners. His “America First” foreign policy and his withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade pact could undermine American credibility sustained by its security and economic commitments in East Asia. Moreover, American soft power as a guardian of universal values and the open and rules-based international order could be lost. Smaller countries might vacillate between the U.S. and China. The consequences could be a disaster.

Since World War II’s end, the U.S. has promoted and expanded the international order based on freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. As a standard bearer of the liberal international order, the U.S. has safeguarded its allies and promoted both free trade and official development assistance for the sake of peace and prosperity in the world. This vision and strategy remained consistent throughout all the postwar U.S. administrations.

Trump, however, didn’t give the world any sign that he would pursue such a role. Instead, his only words echoing through the world are “America first,” which he described as “a new decree to be heard in every foreign capital.” The open and rules-based international order is at risk of collapse.

There are two indispensable factors to shape the international order.

One is power; the other is legitimacy. More powerful states can have a stronger say to form or change the international order than less powerful states do. However, if the order lacks legitimacy — i.e., the right and justification to exercise power — the order is not durable.

Trump’s America will lose this legitimacy while China has failed to show any legitimacy. China can’t be a legitimate leader of the international order if it continues to wield its own “core interests” and excessive nationalism while advocating the “concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security,” as it did this month in a white paper on its policies on Asia-Pacific security cooperation.

The legitimacy of the international order is deeply intertwined with the legitimacy of the domestic order of major powers like the U.S. and China. In this sense, the open and rules-based international order could be reinforced and sustained by America’s political credibility as a liberal democracy and China’s internal development toward a more open and rules-based society.

Now, however, we are witnessing two great powers that prefer might rather than legitimacy and the world is overwhelmed by a widespread feeling of doom and gloom.

In a time of transition marked by uncertainty, however, let’s turn our eyes to a little more optimistic development in East Asia. It is worthy to see positive aspects of globalization in developing East Asia instead of the negative aspects that contributed to the anger and frustration of working-class whites in the highly developed West who helped elect Trump and voted for Brexit.

In East Asia, economic interdependence among countries has deepened and the regional network of telecommunications and transportation has developed. Connectivity and interdependency are notable characteristics that could be the driving forces to change the mindsets and value systems of the people involved in this dynamism.

In China, social media plays an increasingly important role in making society more transparent and fair. More and more people are entering the middle class, enabling them to go overseas for travel and study. The number of Chinese tourists visiting Japan has been increasing dramatically in recent years. They see the world through their old eyes and then see China through their new eyes. Then change occurs.

Every big Chinese city is deeply enmeshed in the global economic order. China’s fastest developing areas — the coastal regions — are vulnerable to any war and economic disruption. China’s sustainable development will depend on regional peace and stability and its commitment to maintaining the open and rules-based international order.

The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party depends on the nation’s economic growth. In recent years, however, China’s economy has been weathering a “new normal” in which its economic prospect are less bright than before.

Additionally, but no less seriously, an increasing disparity between the rich and the poor, serious environmental degradation, an aging society and insufficient social welfare, and rampant corruption are crossing the Chinese people’s “red line.” Who knows when another people’s revolt could occur in China?

President Xi Jinping may know that sustainable development is possible only if China chooses regional cooperation rather than coercion or unilateral action. However, Trump’s provocative language could trigger a more assertive policy incited by hawkish elements in the party and military, and nationalistic netizens. Japan should cultivate and use wise diplomacy to encourage the Chinese leadership to seek legitimacy through sustainable development rather than nationalism.

According to surveys conducted by the Genron NPO think tank and the China Daily newspaper, about 90 percent of respondents in Japan and China have an unfavorable or relatively unfavorable impression of the other. Nevertheless, more than 70 percent of respondents think that bilateral ties are important and the existing relationship is undesirable enough to cause worry or to necessitate improvement. Politicians must take their concerns and expectations seriously.

Both the Japanese and Chinese governments are conducting various diplomatic efforts to improve bilateral relations. Given the increasing uncertainties in the region as previously mentioned, what kind of approach should be prioritized to manage and improve Japan-China relations?

First, political and security tensions must be reduced as much as possible. If tension leads to armed conflict between Japan and China, there will be no winners. Instead, both countries will be losers. As such, an effective mechanism to avoid accidental conflict between the two countries must be established as soon as possible.

Second, Japan and China’s leaders should have face-to-face meetings on a more frequent basis. Diplomats in both countries must work hard to create such opportunities, including the bilateral meeting this year between Japan and China’s leaders to mark the 45th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations.

Third, both governments could set up shared platforms to facilitate interactions involving politicians, bureaucrats, military officers, businesspersons, journalists, scholars, students and tourists to promote mutual understanding and trust. Given the asymmetric flow of people between China and Japan, more Japanese people should strive to visit China, where there are still vast frontiers and vast potential to do business and cooperation in a variety of fields.

Last but not least, Japan must be resilient to remain strong, liberal, democratic and successful itself in the interval before America returns to its role of guardian of the liberal international order.

 

Masahiro Kohara is a professor at the University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Law and Politics. Previously he served as a career diplomat in the Foreign Ministry.

 

 

掲載元

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/01/26/commentary/japan-commentary/east-asia-china-japan-age-donald-trump/#.WKW4CFRKOnN

East Asia in the Trump era (The Japan Times Jan. 8 2017 掲載)

The Japan Times 1月8日に掲載されました。

トランプ政権誕生に向けての東アジア情勢について考えてみました。


What might happen to U.S. foreign policy, in particular its alliance in East Asia, under the leadership of incoming President Donald Trump? Japan faces an increasingly complex security landscape in East Asia. The Trump presidency could make it more uncertain and more unpredictable.

First, North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities now pose a direct threat to Japan and its nuclear capability will probably be further upgraded to be able to hit the continental United States sometime during the Trump administration.

Sanctions don’t appear to be able to stop North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s military ambitions because he believes a nuclear deterrent is the most reliable and perhaps the only guarantee of his regime.

As the threat of his nukes becomes real for the U.S., the Trump administration will have to put it on the foreign policy front burner. Problems, however, could arise from both remarks made by Trump that criticize China for not curbing the North’s ambitions and his preference for bilateral deals including, as he suggested, deals with Kim over a hamburger.

The uncertainty of Trump’s “business-deal diplomacy” is casting a pall on Japanese and South Korean security interests. Despite South Korea’s present political paralysis, the trilateral consultation among the allies is critical to cope correctly and timely with North Korea’s growing threat. And Japan has an additional issue to resolve — the abduction of its citizens by North Korea.

Second, China’s rapid rise and its increasing assertiveness pose daunting challenges of diplomacy and security for the allies and partners of the U.S.

Tensions with China over the Senkaku Islands are raising widespread concern in Japan. China has continued to send government vessels and aircraft into the region. President Barack Obama declared, “Our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands.” His remarks are critically important to peace in Japan and stability in the region as the Japan-U.S. alliance could deter military action against Japan, including the Senkaku Islands. What will occur if Trump doesn’t follow Obama’s policy of mentioning them?

Third, the status quo in the South China Sea has also been gradually changed by China’s “salami-slicing” tactics of taking steps that fall below the threshold of a strong response by interested parties such as the U.S.

The few “freedom of navigation” operations conducted by the U.S. Navy didn’t stop unilateral Chinese actions such as large-scale land reclamation and militarization activities in the South China Sea.

At an international workshop I attended recently, a Chinese scholar asserted, “Japan is too active in the South China Sea.” I responded by saying: “I know President Xi Jinping is resentful of Japan’s involvement in the dispute. Nevertheless, Japan must be active because it depends greatly on foreign trade, in particular, the import of natural resources and energy — most of which are shipped across the South China Sea. The safety of sea lanes and freedom of navigation are of the utmost importance to the survival of Japan. Open, rule-based order in the region is critical to Japan’s national interests.”

Given such security circumstances, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been successful in convincing the majority of citizens to support and strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance and the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal. Both are increasingly regarded in Japan to be an invaluable asset and the linchpin of peace and stability in a geopolitically changing region.

However, Trump asserted that the U.S. would withdraw from the TPP on his first day in the White House. Per the rules laid out in the TPP, a U.S. withdrawal renders the TPP invalid. Nonetheless, Japan ratified the treaty. That is a strong message to the U.S. and the world that Japan will resist protectionism and promote free trade.

During my visit to the U.S. after the presidential election, I heard a frank view from American scholars that gaiatsu (foreign pressure) would need to be used on the U.S.

That word inspired me with an alternative way to help the treaty survive: The TPP’s other 11 member states should work on modifying the rules governing the trade pact’s enforcement to put stronger pressure on the U.S. At present, however, these member states will likely lose motivation to do so if the world’s largest economy withdraws from the treaty. Their attention appears to be turning to the proposed Regional Cooperation Economic Partnership free trade agreement, which China is eager to realize.

Japan should strengthen dialogue with these members from the strategic viewpoint that they and the U.S. will be engaged on a potential pathway to achieve the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, hoping that China will also join by deepening its economic reform to meet the high-standard criteria.

As for security, there are no other security frameworks besides the U.S.-Asia alliance network to maintain the open, rule-based international order in the region.

Abe’s trip to Pearl Harbor hosted by Obama sent a message of the importance of the alliance to Trump, as well as other messages, including the power of reconciliation through forgiveness, to the Asia-Pacific region. Hopefully Trump will understand the pivotal role of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the region and Japan’s fair contribution to it.

In this regard, it would be politically ideal and economically effective if both leaders would commit themselves to the Japan-U.S. alliance and publicly declare their commitment at a meeting held at the earliest possible date after Trump’s presidential inauguration on Jan. 20.

Of course, this doesn’t mean that Japan should put the relationship with China on the back burner. The management and improvement of bilateral ties with China will be another prioritized diplomatic agenda for Japan’s vital national interest in 2017, which marks the 45th anniversary of the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Abe should strive to tackle this difficult but important challenge as a “proactive contributor to peace.”

 

掲載元:

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/01/08/commentary/japan-commentary/east-asia-trump-era/#.WKW2NlRKOnN